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Judicial Disability and the
Good Behavior Clause
Justice Douglas's retirement ended months of speculation about
his health and ability to remain on the Court.' Coming at the end of
a decade during which the fitness of judges was increasingly examined,
his illness stimulated renewed consideration of judicial disability.2
1. Justice Douglas suffered a stroke on December 31, 1974. He returned to the Court
in October, 1975, but found he was unable to continue. On November 12, 1975, he
retired under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1970). N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1975.
at 60, col. 2. For the wording of that section and the distinction between retirement
and resignation, see note 7 infra. Accounts of his illness were given in NEWSWEEK,
July 7, 1975, at 46; TIME, Feb. 17, 1975, at 48; id. Apr. 7, 1975, at 58; id. July 7, 1975,
at 44; U.S. NEws 9- WORLD REP., May 26, 1975, at 69. For a contemporaneous discussion
of possible removal methods, see Reston, Mr. Justice Douglas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1975, at 45, col. 5.
2. In this Note "disability" or "incapacity" refers to a physical or mental condition
which impairs a judge's ability to serve on the court.
A widely-publicized controversy over judicial fitness concerned Judge Stephen S.
Chandler, Chief Judge of the Western District of Oklahoma. An order by the Judicial
Council for the Tenth Circuit that Chandler take part in no future proceedings prompted
many discussions of judicial tenure in the legal literature. E.g., Note, Potential Limi-
tations Upon the Tenure of Federal Trial Judges-Some Implications of the Chandler
Case, 20 Sw. L.J. 667 (1966); Note, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial
Review, 19 STAN. L. REv. 448 (1967); Comment, Removal of Federal Judges-New Al-
ternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1385 (1966); Comment, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives to
Impeachment, 20 VAND. L. REv. 723 (1967); 21 Rur. L. REv. 153 (1966).
In 1970 there were suggestions that the House of Representatives should investigate
Justice Douglas's conduct to determine if it would be appropriate to initiate impeach-
ment proceedings. 116 CONG. REc. 11912-27 (1970): 'That discussion led to a similar burst
of discussion of judicial tenure. E.g., Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior"
Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475 (1970); Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the
Constitutional Provisions, 39 FoPDHAM L. REV. 1 (1970); Thompson & Pollitt, Impeachment
of Federal Judges: An Historical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REv. 87 (1970).
The problem of unfit judges has a long history. A list of all "federal judges whose
official conduct had been the subject of congressional inquiry" before 1962 is printed
in J. BoPKIN, THE CoRuPr JuDGE 219-58 (1962). Two periodicals have devoted entire
issues to the problem: Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 1 (1970); Judicial Mis-
conduct, 48 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 163 (1965).
On a number of occasions congressional committees have held hearings related to ju-
dicial fitness. Hearings on Judicial Disqualification before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); Hearings on Reconfirmation of Federal Judges before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Ses.
(1973); Hearings on the Independence of Federal Judges before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (in-
cluding comprehensive bibliography on the subject of federal judges at 942-49); Hear-
ings on Retirement of Justices and Judges before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 16 (1970); Hearings on the Judicial Reform
Act before the Subcomm. on Improiements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st K- 2d Sess. (1969, 1970); Hearings on Nonjudicial Ac-
tivities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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Numerous remedies have been suggested.3 Two examples of such pro-
posals in the present Congress are S. 1110 and H.R. 10439.4 S. 1110
would establish a Council on Judicial Tenure composed of judges
in regular active service. The proposed Council would receive com-
plaints about judges, conduct investigations, and report to the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States. If a report recommended
removal, the Council would present the evidence to a committee of
the Conference. The Conference, or its committee, would have the
power to order the censure, removal, or involuntary retirement of
any judge or Justice of the United States.
The proposed legislation is premised on the theory that the Con-
stitution, and in particular the good behavior clause,0  permits the
removal of disabled judges.6 This Note focuses on the good behavior
clause and argues that the Constitution does not allow the removal
3. The most varied proposals have been made in the states. A comparative study of
five states is W. B.AIrmwArrE, WHO JuDGEs THE JuDGEs? (1971). The removal provisions
for each state are listed in Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Removal in New
York: A New Look, 40 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1, 37-40 (1971). Other discussions of state re-
moval provisions include Hall, Judicial Removal for Off-Bench Behavior: Why?, 21 J.
Pun. LAW 127 (1972); Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal
and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 149 (1966).
4. S. 1110, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), is printed at 121 CONC. REc. S3407 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1975). Hearings were held in February, 1976, before the Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 1 CCH CONG.
INDEX 94Ms CONG. at 2514 (Mar. 17, 1976).
H.R. 10439, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) is printed at 121 CONG. RE c. H5669 (daily
ed. Oct. 30, 1975). H.R. 10439, which is considerably less detailed than the Senate bill,
would authorize the Chief Justice to select a three-judge panel to investigate the be-
havior of any judge or Justice. If the panel determined the behavior was "not good,"
the judge or Justice would cease to hold office. The bill's sponsor suggested that
evaluation of behavior should include physical capacity and attentiveness to duty. Id.
(Rep. Findley). No hearings have been held on the House bill.
5. U.S. CoNs-r. art. III, § I.
6. Raoul Berger is the most recent scholar to advocate this position. His argument
consists of two basic points: (1) impeachment is not the exclusive removal mechanism
for judges and (2) disabled judges are incapable of good behavior and may therefore
be removed. That argument first appeared in Berger, supra note 2. It was published in
a slightly modified form in R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONsTrrTIONAL PROBLEMS
91, 122-92 (1973), and advanced in support of S. 1110 in Statement of Raoul Berger
submitted to the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 26, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
As Berger acknowledged, the argument did not originate with him. Professor Burke
Shartel was the first to support the position with extensive research. Shartel, Federal
Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities under the Constitu-
tion, 28 Micr. L. REv. 870 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Federal Judges]; Shartel, Re-
tirement and Removal of Judges, 20 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 133 (1936). The same proposal
in less detailed form was made in A. SiMPsoN, A TREATIsE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS
74-75 (1916). Critics of Shartel include Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of
Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHm. L. REv. 665 (1969); Otis, A Proposed
Tribunal: Is It Constitutional? 7 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 3 (1938); Ziskind, Judicial
Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 S. CT.
Rnv. 135.
The Yale Law Journal
of Justices or judges for disability and that no provision should be
made for the replacement of a disabled Supreme Court Justice.7
I. Removal for Disability under the Constitution
The tenure of all federal judges is established by the good behavior
clause of Article III, § 1 of the Constitution:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their office during good Behaviour and shall at stated Times
receive for their Service a Compensation which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in office.
Supporters of proposals such as S. 1110 contend that a judge who is
disabled is not behaving well and may therefore be removed. Whether
a disabled judge may be removed depends, of course, upon the mean-
ing of holding office "during good Behaviour." Because the Framers
took that phrase directly from English law, its meaning in England
provides important evidence of its meaning in the Constitution.
A. The English History
Before 1701 the tenure of English judges was fixed by the Crown.
Each judge was appointed by individual letters patent in which the
king defined the tenure of the office. Although some judges were
appointed "during good behaviour," the more common tenure was
during the king's pleasure: those judges could be removed when-
ever the king desired.8 In 1701, however, Parliament broke with that
tradition and passed the Act of Settlement which regularized judicial
7. A judge is removed when he is deprived of office; there are no provisions in
current federal statutes for removal of judges. A judge is replaced when his disability
leads to the appointment of an additional judge to sit on the same court.
Statutory provisions for resignation, retirement, and replacement of federal judges
are included in 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1970). Subsection (a) permits the retirement of a judge
or Justice who has become "permanently disabled from performing his duties .... "
Any judge wishing to retire under that provision must furnish two certificates of dis-
ability to the President: one from the retiree and one from the Chief Justice or the
chief judge as specified. Subsection (b) permits the President to appoint an additional
judge when a judge found to be disabled does not retire. There is no provision for
replacement of a Justice of the Supreme Court.
The Judicial Code distinguishes resignation from retirement. A judge or Justice who
resigns severs all connection with the court; he ceases to hold his office. After resig-
nation he continues to receive the salary he was paid at the time he resigned. 28 U.S.C.
§ 371(a) (1970). A judge or Justice who retires continues to hold his office and may
accept assignments on various courts. He receives the salary for the office which he holds.
28 U.S.C. §§ 294, 371(b) (1970).
8. H. CECmL, TIPPING THE ScALEs 25-27 (1964); McIlwain, The Tenure of English
Judges, 7 Air. POL. Sci. REv. 217, 219-21 (1913).
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tenure by providing that in the future judges' commissions would
"be made Quam diu se bene Gesserint [during good behavior], and
their Salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of
both houses of parliament it may be lawful to remove them."9
Even before the exact meaning of "during good behavior" is de-
fined, it is apparent that the Act of Settlement was fundamentally a
restriction on the Crown's power to remove judges. All that remained
was the power to remove after receiving an address from both houses
of Parliament. In effect, judges were made independent of the Crown
since they no longer had to depend upon royal approval for their
tenure.' 0
Further understanding of the Act of Settlement depends upon the
meaning of "good behavior" both before and after the passage of
the Act. The meaning of the term was at issue whenever there was
a challenge to the right to continue holding an office with good
behavior tenure. At common law the mechanism used to test the
conditions of any patent was the writ of scire facias.1 That writ, how-
ever, was merely a mechanism for determining whether the office-
holder was fulfilling the substantive conditions of tenure, conditions
which came not from the writ but from the terms of the patent itself
(for example, tenure during good behavior). There are few challenges
to good behavior tenure in the reported English cases.12 No judge
was ever removed by the writ. Nevertheless, the cases do show that
disability alone was never held to be cause for forfeiture of an office
with good behavior tenure.
The fullest discussion of the protections afforded by good behavior
tenure before the Act of Settlement occurred in Harcourt v. Fox.
1
3
9. Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2. An address is a formal communication
of opinion sent to the Crown after being approved by both houses of Parliament. For
the form of an address, see E. MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF
PARLL4,MENT 828-33 (E. Fellowes & T. Cocks eds. 16th ed. 1957).
10. H. CECIL, supra note 8, at 67-89; AV. GwYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION
OF PowERS 7 (Tulane Studies in Political Science vol. IX, 1965); 1 A. TODD, ON PAR-
LIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 571 (2d ed. 1887); M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE SEPARATION OF PoWERs 29-32 (1967); Holdsworth, The Constitutional Position
of the Judges, 48 L.Q. REv. 25, 29 (1932).
11. J. CHiTrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN; AND THE
RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECr 82-87, 330-31 (1820); C. SWEET, A DIC-
TIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 738 (1882).
12. A collection of scire facias cases, none of which involves good behavior tenure,
is reported at 2 Dyer 197b-198b, 73 Eng. Rep. 435-38 (K.B. 1561). Shartel conceded
that the English scire facias cases provided no evidence to support the conclusion that
disability was a cause for removal from offices held during good behavior. Federal Judges,
supra note 6, at 899-900.
13. 1 Show. 506, 89 Eng. Rep. 720 (K.B. 1693), affd, Show. P.C. 158, 1 Eng. Rep.
107 (H.L. 1693). Arguments of counsel are reported in 1 Show. at 426, 89 Eng. Rep. at
680 (K.B. 1692).
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The case involved conflicting claims to the office of clerk of the
peace. The first appointee, Harcourt, sued a later appointee, Fox,
for money (fees) had and received. Before Fox was appointed, a
statute had made the office one held "for so long a time only as
such Clerk of the Peace shall well demean himself in his said office."'
4
The statute further provided for the removal of the clerk for "mis-
demeanor."'15 Since Harcourt had not "misdemeaned himself," the
court decided he was entitled to the fees. In argument before the court,
the attorney general equated the clerk's tenure with good behavior
tenure. The clerk held office "quamdiu se bene gesserit," the at-
torney general explained, "that is, during life, unless he forfeits it
by misdemeanour .... ,,16 Chief Justice Holt echoed that explanation
and stated the tenure was "determinable only upon misbehaviour."' 17
The ready substitution of "misbehaviour" for "misdemeanour" sug-
gests that the speakers considered the terms synonymous. At common
law a "misdemeanor" was a criminal act."8 And not even the most
expansive interpretation of criminal acts would include disability.
Whatever the scope of common law crimes,'0 forfeiture of a good
behavior office required something more than disability.
Cases decided after the Act of Settlement provide no fuller defi-
nition of the meaning of good behavior tenure. The evidence which
is available, however, is entirely consistent with earlier statements that
more than disability was required for removal. R. v. Corporation of
Wells20 was a case involving a request for a writ of mandamus to
order the corporation to restore John Burland to the office of recorder,
which he held during good behavior. Burland was accused of "re-
peated non-attendance" at both regular and special sessions of the
corporation. Lord Mansfield described the reasons for which good
behavior tenure could be forfeited: "Indeed, a general neglect, or
refusal to attend the duty of such an office, is a reason of forfeiture:
a determined neglect, a wilful refusal. ' 21 Later he approved the state-
ment "that the bare being absent, is not a cause of forfeiture." 2
14. 1 W. & M., c. 21, § 5 (1688).
15. Id. § 6.
16. 1 Show. at 556, 89 Eng. Rep. at 750.
17. Id. at 536, 89 Eng. Rep. at 734.
18. C. SWEET, supra note 11, at 530-31; 4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.
19. To be sure, the common law did not define criminal conduct as specifically
as do modern statutes. See, e.g., 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 302-05
(2d ed. 1937). However, that does not detract from the point that some form of mis-
conduct was required for removal from a good behavior office.
20. 4 Burr. 1999, 98 Eng. Rep. 41 (K.B. 1767).
21. Id. at 2004, 98 Eng. Rep. at 44.
22. Id. at 2005, 98 Eng. Rep. at 45.
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If "bare" absence was insufficient for removal, so must have been
"bare" disability.
In the same case Lord Mansfield rejected as too broad a statement
made by Coke in his Commentaries on Littleton. Coke had written
that "non-user of publique offices which concern the administration
of justice, or the common wealth, is of it selfe a cause of forfeiture."23
Although Coke was not writing about judicial officers with good
behavior tenure, his statement has been interpreted as support for
the contention that judges are removable for disability.2 4 But the
phrase "non-user" was a technical term associated with real property,25
and Coke's use of such a term without qualification indicates that
the words retained their established meaning in this novel context.
That meaning is consistent with Lord Mansfield's holding that more
than absence was required. The standard English treatise on ease-
ments explained that "a mere intermittance of the user, or a slight
alteration in the mode of enjoyment, when unaccompanied by any
intention to renounce the acquisition of a right, does not amount
to an abandonment."
2 6
Lord Mansfield explained that it was incorrect to read Coke's state-
ment as requiring no more than absence for forfeiture:
And some have gone so far as to hold, that an office concerning
the administration of justice or the commonwealth, shall be for-
feited for a bare non-user, whether any special damage be occa-
sioned thereby or not. But this opinion doth not appeal to be
warranted by any resolution in point; and the authorities which
are cited to maintain it, do not seem to come up to it.27
Furthermore, Coke himself described forfeiture as resulting from do-
ing "a thing against or without law or custome .... 2s He also wrote
that when an "officer relinquisheth his office, and refuseth to attend,
he loseth his office, fee, profit, and all." 29 Understood in context,
23. CoKE ON LTLE'roN 233a.
24. See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 160-63.
25. Coke's use of a real property term was entirely consistent with the early English
view that all offices were property. See W. CRUIsE, DIGEST OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND
RESPECING REAL PROPERTY 93 (4th ed. 1835); J. JOLIFFE, THE CONsnTIUONAL HISTORY
OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 204-06, 485-87 (4th ed. 1967); D. KEiR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485 (9th ed. 1969).
26. C. GALE & T. WHATLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 276 (E. Hammond
ed. 1840); accord, C. SwsaT, supra note 11, at 539.
27. 4 Burr. at 2004, 98 Eng. Rep. at 44. Lord Mansfield's statement seems to suggest,
however, that forfeiture could follow if some definite harm were caused by the official's
absence.
28. COKE ON LrrrLETON 59a.
29. Id. 233b (emphasis added).
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then, Coke's statement that forfeiture would lie for "non-user" sup-
ports the view that more than disability was required for removal.
Proponents of removal for disability argue that the writ of scire
facias provides a mechanism for removing federal judges in the
United States.3 ° The historical evidence shows this argument to be
a questionable one.3' More importantly, the emphasis on the avail-
ability of scire facias obscures the true issue-the meaning of good
behavior tenure as a substantive protection of office. Regardless of
the mechanism of removal, the early English cases appear to have
protected good behavior officeholders from removal for disability.
And as the next section of this Note demonstrates, the contemporary
understanding of the good behavior tenure clause when it was in-
corporated into the Constitution makes clear that federal judges are
so protected.
B. The American Understanding
Nothing in the colonial period indicates a departure from the
English understanding of the protection for officeholders afforded
by good behavior tenure. In fact, the colonial experience mirrors
English developments. Early colonial judges were appointed to serve
30. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 127-33.
31. There is extensive evidence that at the time the Constitution was adopted im-
peachment was thought to be the exclusive mechanism for removing officers with good
behavior tenure; this was true even though the writ of scire facias was used in the
colonies. JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEW JERSEY,
1683-1702, at 57 passim (P. Edsall ed. 1937). Blackstone's discussion of the use of the
writ to repeal a patent, 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *260-61, would also have been
known to the colonists.
Both Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton were familiar with the writ of scire
facias through their law practices. THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 80
n.215 (G. Chinard ed. 1926); THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 72, 101-03,
162, 180 (J. Goebel ed. 1964). Even so, both men thought impeachment was the only
means of removing a judge with good behavior tenure. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to George Wythe (July, 1776), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 59-60
(P. Ford ed. 1893); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (Dec. 26, 1821),
reprinted in 10 id. at 198-99 (1899); THE COMPLETE JEFFERsON 1173 (S. Padover ed. 1943);
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 192 (H. Washington ed. 1854); THE FEDERALIST
No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
Members of the First Congress agreed that judges with good behavior tenure could
only be removed by impeachment. See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 389, 569 (Madison),
390-91 (Boudinot), 484 (White) (1789) (running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of De-
bates in Congress"). Similar views were held by Thomas Paine. In a pamphlet written
in 1805 urging reform of the Constitution, he was critical of the Constitution for re-
leasing judges "from all responsibility, except for impeachment." 10 THE LIFE AND
WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 267 (W. Van der Weyde ed. 1925).
For additional evidence that impeachment was thought to be the sole mechanism
for removal, see note 53 infra.
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at the king's pleasure.32 By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the
colonists recognized that good behavior tenure was the cornerstone
of judicial independence.33 Indicative of the colonists' awareness of
the significance of the Act of Settlement and of their knowledge of
English legal precedents was a series of articles in the Massachusetts
Gazette in 1773. There, John Adams argued that judicial good be-
havior tenure was mandated by the Act of Settlement and not by
the common law.34
Additional evidence of the importance which Americans attached to
good behavior tenure can be found in Thomas Jefferson's 1776 drafts
of the first Virginia state constitution. They provided that all judges
were to serve during good behavior and further that lower court
judges could be removed by the highest court for breach of good
behavior. The judges of the highest court were in turn removable
by the legislature for a similar breach.33 Years later, Jefferson com-
plained that these provisions in the Virginia constitution had made
judges "independent of the nation itself . . . [and] irremovable, but
by their own body, for any depravities of conduct, and even by their
own body for the imbecilities of dotage."3
Jefferson's statement that good behavior officers were not remov-
able for incapacity was but one example of the widespread American
belief. Another example can be found in the 1780 impeachment
trial of Judge Francis Hopkinson of Pennsylvania. In its opinion the
Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council wrote, "In the first place
32. See, e.g., L. LARABEE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 388-400 (1930); G. WASH-
BURNE, IMPERIAL CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN TIIE THIRTEEN COLONIES
1684-1776, at 20, 178 (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Columbia Uni-
versity, vol. CV, no. 2, 1923). As recently as 1953, British colonial judges still held
office at the Queen's pleasure. Terrell v. Secretary of State for the Colonies, [1953] 2
Q.B. 482.
33. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEW
JERSEY 1683-1702, at 18-19 (P. Edsall ed. 1937); H. ScoTT, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 134-37 (1909); A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, 1760, reprinted in
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMiERICAN REVOLUTION 248 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965).
Two English writers who were influential in America also believed in the necessity
of good behavior tenure for judges. Blackstone wrote on the importance of an inde-
pendent judiciary. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *267, *269. Blackstone's successor
at Oxford, Wooddeson, had similar thoughts about the Act of Settlement. 1 R. WOODDESON,
A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 88 (1792).
34. On the Independence of the Judiciary: A Controversy between William Brattle
and John Adams, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 511 (C. Adams ed. 1851).
35. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMIAS JEFFERSON 343, 351, 361 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Jefferson's
removal provisions were included in the impeachment clauses of the Virginia con-
stitution as approved. The text of that constitution is printed in 2 B. PooRE, THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1910 (2d ed. 1878).
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, reprinted in
10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (P. Ford ed. 1899).
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it is observable, that the commission of the Judge is during good
behaviour; crimes only are causes of removal .... .,,3 The juxtapo-
sition of "crimes" and "good behaviour" made it clear that the mech-
anism for removal was irrelevant; no one could be removed from a
good behavior office without having committed a crime. That opinion
merely reiterates what had been said a century earlier in the English
courts.
38
Thus at the time of the Constitutional Convention both the English
and the Americans thought good behavior tenure excluded removal
for disability. As Alexander Hanson, a proponent of the Constitution,
explained in 1788, good behavior in a judge was not an ambiguous
concept, but one related "to the laws, and things universally known.""3
That shared understanding was reflected in the Convention's una-
nimity on the tenure for federal judges.40 In England judges were
removable by an address of both houses of Parliament.4' But in
their desire to insulate the judiciary even more and to eliminate
any discretionary element in the legislature, the Framers rejected re-
moval by address. Gouverneur Morris, for example, thought "it was
fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority";
Edmund Randolph "opposed the motion as weakening too much the
independence of the Judges"; and James Wilson of Pennsylvania
said, "The judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend
37. TRIAL OF FRANCIS HOPKINSON 1780, in PENNSYLVANIA STATE TRIALS 56 (E. Hogan
ed. 1794). In 1786 the General Assembly of Rhode Island expressed a similar view after
initiating impeachment proceedings against the judges of the supreme court for their
judgment in a case. Although a large majority of the Assembly voted that the judges
had not given satisfactory reasons for the judgment, the Assembly felt it could take no
action since the judges were not charged with criminal conduct. 4 AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 584, 597-99 (J. Lawson ed. 1915).
38. See Harcourt v. Fox, 1 Show. 506, 89 Eng. Rep. 720 (K.B. 1693), afj'd, Show.
P. C. 158, 1 Eng. Rep. 107 (H.L. 1693); pp. 709-10 supra.
39. A. HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A FEDERAL GOVFRNMENT (1788),
reprinted in 47 MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 61, 79 (1933).
40. Even though the states were not uniform in their provisions for judicial tenure,
all of the proposals at the Constitutional Convention contained the same tenure pro-
visions for the federal judiciary. See 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (rev. ed. 1937) (Virginia Plan) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND];
id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan); 3 id. at 600 (draft attributed to Charles Pinckney); id. at
621, 625 (Alexander Hamilton); B. LONG, GENESIS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 189-90 (1926); A NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFrER THlE
REVOLUTION 1775-1789, at 166-67 (1924); Ziskind, supra note 6, at 135.
The explanation for this unanimity is probably that the Framers were influenced by
the English national structure rather than by the states. Support for that conclusion
comes from the complaint in the Declaration of Independence that the king had "made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount
and payment of their salaries." S. Doc. No. 93-1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 585, 587 (1973)
(Declaration reprinted). For discussion of the drafting of that provision, see E. DuImBAULD,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 112 (1950).
41. See pp. 708-09 supra.
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upon every gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches
of our Govt."
42
The general acceptance of the principle that federal judges should
serve during good behavior meant their tenure received little dis-
cussion either at the Convention or in the ratification debates.
43
One opponent of the Constitution, however, recognized the implica-
tion of the tenure provisions of Article III, § 1, and complained,
"There is no authority that can remove them from office for any
errors or want of capacity, or lower their salaries, and in many cases
their power is superior to that of the legislature."4 4 The order of
the statement (tenure followed by salary provisions) indicates that
the author was referring to the good behavior clause. Had the Con-
stitution's defenders disagreed with this statement they could have
argued that the statement was founded upon a misunderstanding of
the clause. But they did not adopt that tactic. Instead, Hamilton
argued in The Federalist that the ban on removal for disability was
desirable:
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account
of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate
men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be
practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated
to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of
the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known
arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of
ability and inability would much oftener give scope to personal
and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests
of justice or the public good. The result, except in the case of
42. 2 FARRND, supra note 40, at 428-29. Removal for disability was mentioned only
during debate on a motion that the chief executive "'be removeable on impeachment
and conviction <for> malpractice or neglect of duty.'" Id. at 64. The debate concerned
the Presidency, an office held for a term of years; at no time was good behavior tenure
discussed. James Madison "thought it indispensible that some provision should be made
for defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief
Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service, was not a sufficient security."
Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Gouverneur Morris was the other person who mentioned
disability. He began his remarks by distinguishing the executive from the judiciary:
"Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest .... ." Id. at 68. He
continued, "The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery; Corrupting
his electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment." Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
43. In the Pennsylania ratification convention, for example, James Wilson, a Framer
and later a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said, "I hear no objection
made to the tenure by which the judges hold their offices." J. WILSoN, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERmCA 95 (T. Lloyd ed. 1792).
44. THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 224 (M. Borden ed. 1965) (emphasis added). The com-
ment was signed "Brutus," who was described by Borden as the "most brilliant of all
Antifederalist writers." Id. at 42. There is disagreement over the identity of "Brutus."
He has been identified as either Thomas Treadwell or Robert Yates. Id. at 42; J. MAIN,
Tim ANTI-FEDERALISTS 117, 287 (1961).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 706, 1976
insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, with-
out any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced
to be a virtual disqualification.
4a
For present purposes, the most striking feature of this exchange be-
tween opponents and supporters of the Constitution is not their dif-
ferences over the merits of good behavior tenure for judges, but their
common understanding that the grant of such tenure precluded re-
moval for incapacity.
Following the Constitutional Convention there were repeated con-
firmations of the widespread understanding of the protection af-
forded by good behavior tenure. In 1789 the First Congress debated
the President's power to remove executive officials. The central issue
in that debate was whether the Constitution required that impeach-
ment be the only means of removing executive officials other than
the President and Vice President. Throughout the debate the speak-
ers contrasted executive officials with judges who held office during
good behavior: for the former there was no limitation on the causes
of removal; for the latter the causes were restricted by their tenure.
Although there was no agreement on the extent of the President's
power to remove executive officials, there was a uniform understand-
ing that the good behavior clause meant that judges were not re-
45. TiE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Berger reads Hamilton's
last sentence to say that insanity was a cause for removal. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at
139, 184. In fact, the paragraph taken as a whole demonstrates the contrary. Hamilton
was defending the absence of a provision for removal of judges for disability by arguing
that such a provision would lead to arbitrary results except in the case of insanity; even
in this case, he contended, the provision would be unnecessary because the judge would
be "virtually" disqualified. His use of the word "virtual" in a passage about removal
indicates that he meant something other than "actual" removal-perhaps a disqualifi-
cation in the sense of no longer being able to function as a judge.
Some 50 years later, Justice Story echoed Hamilton's argument against a provision
for removal for disability:
But all considerate persons will readily perceive, that such a provision would
either not be practised upon, or would be more liable to abuse, than calculated to
answer any good purpose. . . . An attempt to fix the boundaries between the
region of ability and inability would much oftener give rise to personal, or party
attachments and hostilities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public
good. And instances of absolute imbecility would be too rare to justify the intro-
duction of so dangerous a provision.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 486 (1833). Story's last sentence makes
clear that insanity-or in his words, "absolute imbecility"-would not be cause for re-
moval absent the "dangerous provision."
Berger also interprets Hamilton's last sentence as assuming the existence of a re-
moval process other than impeachment. R. BERCER, supra note 6, at 184. This position
is contradicted by Hamilton's own words in the paragraph preceding the one quoted
in the text; in that paragraph he wrote that impeachment was the only removal process
for judges. THE F.DERALIST No. 79, supra at 474, quoted in note 53 infra.
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movable for disability.40 Representative William Smith asked, "What
must be done if an incumbent [good behavior officeholder] is found
unfit for his office? He would answer, the person must remain there." 47
Samuel Livermore said of judges with good behavior tenure, "[T]hey
have an inheritance which they cannot be divested of, but on convic-
tion of some crime."48 Two other speakers also directly addressed the
issue of a disabled judge. John Lawrence said that good behavior
tenure meant the officers were not removable for disability alone. "We
are told," he said, "that an officer must misbehave before he can be
removed. This is true with respect to those officers who hold their
commissions during good behavior, but it cannot be true of those
who are appointed during pleasure, they may be removed for in-
capacity ..... "49 Representative Jackson inquired whether a judge
rendered unfit by a stroke could be removed. He answered his own
question: "Not for this cause, it is impossible; because madness is
no treason, crime or misdemeanor. If he does not choose to resign,
like Lord Mansfield, he may continue in office for ninety or one
hundred years, although seldom so long have any men retained their
faculties."0
Fifteen years after those debates the House voted to impeach Dis-
trict Judge John Pickering, a man who all agreed was insane.5' Rather
than charge him with mere disability by virtue of his insanity, how-
ever, the House accused him of specific misdeeds. And Pickering's
insanity was used as a defense to the charges52-compelling evidence
of the belief that disability was not a ground for removal. Anyone
who thought disability was cause for removal could have adopted the
statements of Pickering's defenders. But no one did so. 53
46. See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 389, 569 (Madison), 390-91 (Boudinot), 477 (Hunt-
ington), 484 (White) (1789) (running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in
Congress').
47. Id. at 392. Accord, id. at 475, 489, 528.
48. Id. at 497. Accord, id. at 396.
49. Id. at 501. Accord, id. at 392.
50. Id. at 507.
51. 3 A. BEvERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 164-65 (1919), citing 13 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 334-42 (1804) (depositions in the impeachment proceedings).
52. 13 ANNALS OF CoNGREss 326-28 (1804).
53. Indirect support for the position that disability was not cause for removal from
good behavior tenure offices comes from the widely held view that impeachment was
the sole method for removing judges, see note 31 supra, and that impeachment did
not lie for disability. For example, Hamilton wrote that judges
are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and
tried by the Senate; . . . . This is the only provision on the point which is con-
sistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and it is the only
one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
THE FEDERALUST No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Two influential early commentators on the Constitution who stressed that impeach-
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The Framers chose good behavior tenure to limit the power to
remove judges and to ensure judicial independence. The entire his-
tory of good behavior tenure, both in England and in America,
denies the possibility of removal for disability. Thus, insofar as pro-
posals like S. 111054 would permit the removal of a disabled judge,
they violate the constitutional protection given to federal judges by
the good behavior clause.
II. Statutory Provisions
The unconstitutionality of removal proposals does not foreclose the
extension to Supreme Court Justices of the provisions in § 372(b) of
the Judicial Code for replacing disabled federal judges.55 Such an ex-
tension would allow the President to appoint an additional Justice
whenever a sitting Justice became permanently disabled. Or Con-
gress could itself enlarge the Court by one for each disabled Justice.
Neither course would be unconstitutional, but either would be unwise.
The Framers realized that disability was so vague a concept that
it would be utilized for political intrigues.56 Extension of § 372(b)
would create a risk of subjecting the Justices to the very pressures
ment was the sole method of removing judges also thought that impeachment would
not lie for disability alone. Rawle wrote, "A commission granted during good behaviour
can only be revoked by this mode [impeachment] of proceeding," and
If a judge should be incapacitated by infirmity or age, or be otherwise, without any
fault of his own, prevented from performing his duties, he would not be a proper
subject for removal by impeachment; yet, where duties cannot be performed, the
officer should not be continued.
W. RAwLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 218, 278 (2d ed. 1829).
(The final clause in Rawle's sentence is admittedly ambiguous. But to interpret it as
a statement that good behavior officers could be removed for disability by some means
other than impeachment would contradict his earlier, explicit statement.) The other
commentator, James Bayard, thought that judges were removable only by impeachment
"for any abuse of their trust." J. BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 119 (2d ed. 1834).
Later recognition that impeachment did not lie for disability came when Congress
was considering special bills to allow several Supreme Court Justices to retire. See note
64 infra. The debates on the bill to allow Justice Ward Hunt's retirement made clear
that Congress did not think it could impeach Justice Hunt for disability. 13 CONG. REC.
505-06, 612-18 (1882). The House report accompanying a similar bill for Justice William
Moody explicitly rejected impeachment for disability:
There is no way of removing an associate justice from his office except by im-
peachment, and impeachment can be had only after conviction of high crimes and
misdemeanors.
A Judge may die, resign, or retire under the statute, but of course he can not,
and should not, be impeached for ill health.
45 CONG. Rxc. 8557 (1910).
54. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see p. 707 supra.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1970). See note 7 supra.
56. See pp. 714-16 supra.
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which the Framers sought to avoid. Lower federal courts are seldom
important enough to warrant interference, and their number makes
impractical any attempt to influence their decisions. But the Supreme
Court is both more important and more easily manipulated; a single
vote is often determinative. Similar considerations convinced the Con-
gress not to extend the replacement provisions of § 372(b) to the
Supreme Court. 7 On one occasion a President actually tried to in-
terfere with the Court-Franklin Roosevelt's famous "court-packing"
plan.'; On other occasions, a President might have been tempted to
interfere, had a provision such as § 372(b) been available.59 For ex-
ample, Justice Howell Jackson's illness during the Income Tax Cases
would have provided an opportunity for a political appointment.60
Justice Douglas's illness during an important capital punishment case""
was a similar instance.
Because the danger of Presidential tampering is a real one, it is
important to consider the actual harm done by illness on the Su-
preme Court. Without a doubt a single Justice's absence can cause
hardship on an already busy Court. 2 But the frequency of disability
on the Court is declining. Of the ninety-three past Justices at least
fifteen suffered mental or physical incapacity for more than a year
before leaving the Court. 3 Over the past century, however, Congress
57. See 53 CONG. REc. 2685-88 and 54 CONG. REc. 42-52 (debates on S. 706, 64th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (1916)).
58. See J. ALsop & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK,
THE DUEL BLTWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967); Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing" Plan, in EssAYs ON THE NEW DEAL 69 (H. Hollings-
worth & W. Holmes eds. 1969). For an earlier instance, when a president considered
altering judicial tenure as a reaction to a decision in an important antitrust case, see
N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1906, at 1, col. 1.
59. Congress has also been tempted to interfere with the composition and tenure of
the judiciary. See NV. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES v (1918). For
discussion of some of those congressional attempts, see Holloman, The Judicial Reform
Act: History, Analysis, and Comment, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 130 (1970); Kurland,
supra note 6, at 665-66; Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND.
L. REv. 925 (1965).
60. Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court, 4 Am. J. LEG. HIsT. 95, 101 (1960).
61. Fowler v. North Carolina, cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974), argued, 43 U.S.L.W.
3582 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975), restored for reargument, 422 U.S. 1039 (1975).
62. The most recent illustration, of course, was provided by Justice Douglas. After
his stroke the Court rescheduled eleven arguments for the fall term. NEWSWEEK, July
7, 1975, at 46. It was also reported that the other Justices had agreed not to count his
vote whenever it created the majority. TIME, July 7, 1975, at 44; N.Y. Times, July 13,
1975, § 4, at 2, col. 1; id. July 8, 1975, at 17, col. 1.
Almost a century earlier the partial paralysis of Chief Justice Waite was alleged to
have contributed to the Court's backlog of cases. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1885, at 4, col. 4.
Justice Moody's illness in 1910 also led to the reargument of important cases. 16 VA. L.
REG. 218, 219 (1910).
63. Fifteen is a conservative estimate reached by reading all the obituaries and
memorial services published in the official court reports and all news items about a
Justice in the New York Times. For brief biographies of all the Justices, see THE
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has liberalized the retirement provisions for judges.64 Of the Justices
appointed this century, only William Moody remained on the Court
after his disability became evident.65 Not since 1910 has an incapac-
itated Justice lingered on the Court. Furthermore, the Court appears
to have developed an informal procedure whereby the other Justices
suggest retirement to a Justice whose health or capabilities are fail-
ing. 6 The dangers from additional appointments are great; the ac-
tual harm from judicial disability is slight. With that balance it would
be better to leave the decision to retire to the individual Justice. The
Framers were willing to accept the inconvenience of disability, and
there is no convincing evidence that their choice was incorrect.
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969 (L. Friedman & F. Israel
eds. 1969); other sources of information about disability on the Court include Fairman,
The Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 HARV. L. Rxv. 397 (1938) (primarily nineteenth
century Justices); and Goff, supra note 60.
64. In 1869 Congress authorized a pension for judges who retired after ten years'
service. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 45 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372
(1970)). Three times Congress specifically extended the statute to induce an ailing
Justice to retire.
In January, 1882, Congress passed a bill extending the retirement provisions to Justice
Ward Hunt, provided that he retire within thirty days. Act of Jan. 27, 1882, ch. 4,
22 Stat. 2. Justice Hunt resigned the day the bill was signed. 118 U.S. 701-02 (1886).
A similar bill was passed for Justice William Moody. Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 377,
36 Stat. 1861. In his case, though, Congress allowed him five months to resign. The
last special provision was passed for Justice Mahlon Pitney who had served a full ten
years but had not yet reached age seventy. Act of Dec. 11, 1922, ch. 1, 42 Stat. 1063.
See 64 CONG. REC. 18 (1922).
In 1929 the statute was amended to require only a total of ten years' service (pre-
viously ten consecutive years had been required). Act of Mar. 1, 1929, ch. 419, 45
Stat. 1422 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372 (1970)). The reason for that amendment
was to permit Chief Justice Taft to retire. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1930, at 1, col. 8.
The pension provisions have been liberalized since 1929. A judge may now retire with
full pay at age sixty-five after fifteen years' judicial service or at seventy after ten;
a disabled judge who has not served ten years may retire at half pay, 28 U.S.C. §§ 371,
372 (1970).
65. See Goff, supra note 60, at 95. Some might include Justice Holmes as well.
Id. at 104-06.
66. Justice Harlan's anecdote about Justice Field is probably the best known illus-
tration of this informal procedure. Justice Field's abilities had been deteriorating for
some time when the other Justices deputized Harlan to suggest retirement. Harlan's
reluctance to mention retirement was heightened by Field's soporific state during
their conversation. Nevertheless, Harlan broached the subject by recalling that Field
himself had suggested resignation to Justice Grier in 1870. Then, according to Harlan,
The old man [Field] listened, gradually became alert and finally, with his eyes
blazing with the old fire of youth, he burst out:
"Yesl And a dirtier day's work I never did in my lifel"
C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75-76 (1928). In 1932 the other
Justices suggested to Justice Holmes that he retire. Goff, supra note 60, at 106.
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